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Martin Pollrich
Martin Pollrich
ENS Paris Saclay
Verified email at ens-paris-saclay.fr - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Mediated audits
M Pollrich
The RAND Journal of Economics 48 (1), 44-68, 2017
92017
Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification
M Pollrich, L Wagner
European Economic Review 89, 345-360, 2016
82016
Optimal auctions with signaling bidders
O Bos, M Pollrich
ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2020
72020
Sweet Lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations
C von Negenborn, M Pollrich
Journal of Economic Theory 189, 105074, 2020
62020
Sequential procurement with limited commitment
N Fugger, V Gretschko, M Pollrich
ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2019
52019
Informational opacity and honest certification
M Pollrich, L Wagner
DIW Berlin Discussion Paper, 2013
52013
Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure
O Bos, M Pollrich
Available at SSRN 4252493, 2022
32022
Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement
V Gretschko, M Pollrich
Management Science 68 (7), 5146-5161, 2022
32022
Gütesiegel: Zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern
M Pollrich, L Wagner
DIW Wochenbericht 80 (19), 15-18, 2013
32013
On the (ir) relevance of fee structures in certification
M Pollrich, R Strausz
22023
Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement
V Gretschko, M Pollrich
ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2019
22019
The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment
M Pollrich
BDPEMS Working Paper, 2015
22015
Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation
M Pollrich, RC Schmidt
Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS) Working …, 2014
22014
Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation
M Pollrich, RC Schmidt
22014
Hold-Up with Unobservable Investment and the Value of Restricting to Simple Contracts
M Pollrich
Available at SSRN 4326246, 2023
2023
Information design in sequential procurement
N Fugger, V Gretschko, M Pollrich
Games and Economic Behavior 135, 79-85, 2022
2022
Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations
M Pollrich, C von Negenborn
Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, 2018
2018
Essays in Microeconomics
M Pollrich
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2015
2015
The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment-Preliminary and Incomplete Version
M Pollrich
BDPEMS Working Papers, 2015
2015
On the benefits of mediation in contracting problems with limited commitment
M Pollrich
2013
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