| The kin system as a poverty trap? K Hoff, A Sen World Bank, 2005 | 298 | 2005 |
| Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium D Abreu, A Sen Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 997-1021, 1991 | 277 | 1991 |
| Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant‐strategy implementation S Bikhchandani, S Chatterji, R Lavi, A Mu'alem, N Nisan, A Sen Econometrica 74 (4), 1109-1132, 2006 | 256 | 2006 |
| Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition D Abreu, A Sen Journal of Economic theory 50 (2), 285-299, 1990 | 218 | 1990 |
| A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation B Dutta, A Sen The Review of Economic Studies 58 (1), 121-128, 1991 | 189 | 1991 |
| Nash implementation with partially honest individuals B Dutta, A Sen Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 154-169, 2012 | 164 | 2012 |
| Dictatorial domains N Aswal, S Chatterji, A Sen Economic Theory 22, 45-62, 2003 | 129 | 2003 |
| Strategy-proof social choice correspondences S Barbera, B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2), 374-394, 2001 | 124 | 2001 |
| Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability ML Breton, A Sen Econometrica 67 (3), 605-628, 1999 | 117 | 1999 |
| Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments B Dutta, A Sen, R Vohra Economic Design 1, 173-203, 1994 | 106 | 1994 |
| Implementation under strong equilibrium: A complete characterization B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Mathematical Economics 20 (1), 49-67, 1991 | 90 | 1991 |
| Tops-only domains S Chatterji, A Sen Economic Theory 46 (2), 255-282, 2011 | 78 | 2011 |
| Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem A Sen Economics Letters 70 (3), 381-385, 2001 | 77 | 2001 |
| The Price of Inequality. How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future AK Sen New York, 2012 | 76 | 2012 |
| Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules D Majumdar, A Sen Econometrica 72 (2), 523-540, 2004 | 75 | 2004 |
| Effect of job satisfaction on stress, performance and health in self-paced repetitive work M Rahman, AK Sen International archives of occupational and environmental health 59, 115-121, 1987 | 67 | 1987 |
| Random dictatorship domains S Chatterji, A Sen, H Zeng Games and Economic Behavior 86, 212-236, 2014 | 61 | 2014 |
| Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes B Dutta, H Peters, A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 28 (1), 163-179, 2007 | 59 | 2007 |
| On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions S Chatterji, R Sanver, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 148 (3), 1050-1073, 2013 | 52 | 2013 |
| Ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1), 90-101, 1996 | 52 | 1996 |
Bhaskar DuttaProfessor of Economics, University of WarwickVerified email at warwick.ac.uk
