| Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno Journal of Economic Theory 145 (5), 1648-1674, 2010 | 150 | 2010 |
| Group strategy-proofness in private good economies S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno American Economic Review 106 (4), 1073-1099, 2016 | 66 | 2016 |
| Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno Social Choice and Welfare 39 (2), 335-352, 2012 | 64 | 2012 |
| Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences D Berga Mathematical Social Sciences 35 (2), 105-120, 1998 | 54 | 1998 |
| Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good D Berga, S Serizawa Journal of Economic Theory 90 (1), 39-61, 2000 | 43 | 2000 |
| Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno International Journal of Game Theory 41, 791-808, 2012 | 36 | 2012 |
| Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences D Berga, B Moreno Social Choice and Welfare 32 (2), 275-298, 2009 | 32 | 2009 |
| Stability and voting by committees with exit D Berga, G Bergantiños, J Massó, A Neme Social Choice and Welfare 23, 229-247, 2004 | 32 | 2004 |
| On exiting after voting D Berga, G Bergantiños, J Massó, A Neme International Journal of Game Theory 34, 33-54, 2006 | 22 | 2006 |
| Impartial social rankings D Berga, R Gjorgjiev Manuscript, 8, 2014 | 14 | 2014 |
| Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 490-509, 2012 | 14 | 2012 |
| Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes D Berga Social Choice and Welfare 19 (1), 175-192, 2002 | 13 | 2002 |
| Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno Games and Economic Behavior 131, 1-28, 2022 | 9* | 2022 |
| A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model K Hatsumi, D Berga, S Serizawa International Journal of Game Theory 43, 153-168, 2014 | 9 | 2014 |
| Single-dipped preferences S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno | 9 | 2009 |
| Maximal domains and strategy-proofness in public good economies D Berga Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1997 | 9 | 1997 |
| An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit D Berga, G Bergantiños, J Massó, A Neme Mathematical Social Sciences 54 (2), 152-175, 2007 | 7 | 2007 |
| Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness D Berga, B Moreno Economics Letters 196, 109493, 2020 | 6 | 2020 |
| Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno Social Choice and Welfare 54, 237-258, 2020 | 6 | 2020 |
| Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation S Barberà, D Berga-Colom, B Moreno Division and House Allocation (February 13, 2014), 2014 | 6 | 2014 |
Jordi MassóProfessor of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaVerified email at uab.es
